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Abstract—Wide adoption of artificial neural networks in var-
ious domains has led to an increasing interest in defending
adversarial attacks against them. Preprocessing defense methods
such as pixel discretization are particularly attractive in practice
due to their simplicity, low computational overhead, and appli-
cability to various systems. It is observed that such methods
work well on simple datasets like MNIST, but break on more
complicated ones like ImageNet under recently proposed strong
white-box attacks. To understand the conditions for success and
potentials for improvement, we study the pixel discretization
defense method, including more sophisticated variants that take
into account the properties of the dataset being discretized. Our
results again show poor resistance against the strong attacks. We
analyze our results in a theoretical framework and offer strong
evidence that pixel discretization is unlikely to work on all but
the simplest of the datasets. Furthermore, our arguments present
insights why some other preprocessing defenses may be insecure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning models have been shown to be vulnerable
to adversarial perturbations, which are slight perturbations of
natural input data but are classified differently than the natural
input [1]. Adversarial robustness, or reducing this vulnerability
to adversarial perturbations, of deep neural networks (DNNs)
has received significant attention in recent years ([2], [3], [4],
[5], [6], [7], [8], [9]), due to the interest of deploying deep
learning systems in various security-sensitive or security-critical
applications, such as self-driving cars and identification systems.
Among various methods, defense methods that preprocess the
input and then pass them to the existing learning systems are
particularly attractive in practice due to their simplicity, low
computational overhead, and direct applicability to various
neural network systems without interfering with the training.
Various such preprocessing methods have been proposed and
achieve good results against some old attacks. Unfortunately,
as observed by Athalye et al. [10], when applied to typical
datasets, these methods fall in front of the stronger Backward
Pass Differentiable Approximation attack (BPDA). It is now
a general perception that preprocessing methods cannot work
against such strong attacks. However, the question about why
they fail remain largely open.
This paper studies a prototypical preprocessing defense
method called pixel discretization, taking a first step towards
understanding the effectiveness and limitations of such methods.
Pixel discretization works by first constructing a codebook of
codewords (also called codes) for pixel values, then discretizing
an input vector using these codewords, and finally feeding the
discretized input to a pre-trained base model, with the hope
that adversarial noise can be removed by the discretization.
For example, the color-depth reduction by Xu et al. [5] and
the subsequent thermometer encoding technique proposed by
[6] essentially “round” pixels to nearby codewords during
preprocessing. They achieve good results on simple datasets
such as MNIST [11] against strong attacks such as Carlini-
Wagner [12], but later are shown to achieve poor performance
against BPDA when applied to datasets of moderate or higher
complexity (such as CIFAR-10 [13]). However, we observe that
both of these pixel discretization proposals employ very simple
codes which are completely independent of the data distribution.
This thus leads to the following natural and intriguing question:
Are there more sophisticated pixel discretization
techniques, especially those that are data-specific,
which would be significantly better against white-
box attacks?
This paper studies the effectiveness of pixel discretization
techniques, including data-specific ones, through extensive
theoretical and empirical analyses. Our main results suggest a
strong negative answer for the above question: if the underlying
base model has poor adversarial robustness, pixel discretization
is unlikely to improve robustness except for very simple
datasets. On one hand, we obtain strong performance on simple
datasets like MNIST, identify conditions under which the
method can provably work, and propose a simple certificate that
can be computed to lower bound the performance against any
attacks within a budget. On the other hand, poor performance
is observed on more complicated datasets like CIFAR-10. We
then provide detailed analysis on why the method fails on such
data.
A primary tenet of our study is to view discretization by
codewords as constructing a clustering of pixels, where pixels
in the same cluster gets assigned to the same codeword. Our
key observation is a stringent tradeoff between accuracy and
robustness: To allow only a marginal reduction in accuracy,
we would like to keep our clusters of pixels small so that
only close enough pixels map to cluster centers. However, on
complex data this requires many small, closely-packed clusters
whose boundary pixels can be easily perturbed to pixels in
other clusters, implying that robustness will not be high enough
if the underlying base model has poor adversarial robustness.
As a result, our theoretical and empirical analyses hinge on
the separability of pixels: If the pixels form well-separated clus-
ters, we can easily map them to cluster centroids and achieve
a discretization where pixel perturbation does not change the
clusters they belong to, implying adversarial robustness. Based
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on this understanding, we provide a framework for formally
certifying adversarial robustness. While our theory is able to
provide certificates of robustness for simple datasets such as
MNIST, for more complex datasets like CIFAR-10, we show
by various means that pixel discretization is an inadequate
defense against adversarial examples. More specifically, com-
plex datasets do not form well-separated clusters, so pixel
discretization is unlikely to improve adversarial robustness.
Many of our arguments are general and may be used to
study other preprocessing techniques as well. For instance, if
a defense is not performed at the pixel level but at the level
of patches of pixels, our arguments will extend to that defense
as well.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We develop more sophisticated pixel discretization tech-
niques that take into account the structure of the data
points for discretization. Our experiments show that even
these sophisticated defenses do not perform well against
BPDA attacks.
• We develop a theoretical framework for pixel discretization
defenses and present conditions under which they are
robust.
• We confirm the general expectation that pixel discretiza-
tion works well on simple datasets like MNIST. In fact,
we are able to formally certify that pixel discretization on
such datasets is robust against any adversarial attack. This
also shows that gradient masking preprocessing defenses
are possible for some simple distributions.
• We further analyze complex datasets like CIFAR-10 to
argue that it is unlikely to achieve robustness with pixel
discretization on these datasets.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the necessary background. We then present our
experiments with color-depth reduction defense in Section III.
We then explore data-specific pixel discretization defenses in
Section IV. In Section V, we present our theoretical framework
for analyzing the results as well as present further empirical
results on MNIST and CIFAR-10 supporting the analysis. We
present a discussion with insights on preprocessing defenses
in general in Section VI. Finally, we present related work in
Section VII and conclude in Section VIII.
The code for the experiments is available at https://github.
com/jfc43/pixel-discretization.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section presents the relevant background for this work,
important definitions, and the datasets used in our evaluations.
A. Background
Deep neural network (DNN) models are often vulnerable to
adversarial inputs, which are slight perturbations of “natural”
test inputs but lead the model to produce adversary-selected
outputs different from the outputs to the natural inputs. The
susceptibility of neural networks to adversarial perturbations
was first discovered by [14], [1], and a large body of research
has been devoted to it since then. A long line of recent research
is dedicated to attacks with and defenses against adversarial
perturbations. Several other types of attacks have been explored
in the context of machine learning. These include training-time
attacks where an adversary wishes to poison a data set so
that a “bad” hypothesis is learned by an ML-algorithm; model
extraction attacks where an attacker learns a model by making
queries to an available model; and a model inversion attack
where the attacker recovers the inputs used to train a model.
The reader is referred to Section VII for a very brief survey
of these research works.
In this paper, we focus on test-time attacks on super-
vised image classification problems. The input image x ∈
RH×W×C (the image has H rows, W columns and C channels).
x[i, j, l] represents the value of ith row, jth column and lth
channel of the image. x[i, j] represents the pixel at ith row
and jth column. We have a DNN model Fθ (where θ are
model parameters, and we simply write F if θ is clear from
the context) that maps RH×W×C to a set of class labels. In
our context we assume that the classifier F has been trained
without any interference from the attacker (i.e. no training time
attacks). Given an attack distance metric ‖ · ‖, the goal of an
attacker is to craft a perturbation δ so that F (x+δ) 6= F (x),
where x ∼ D and ‖δ‖ ≤ ε. There are several algorithms for
crafting the perturbation δ, but in this paper we use the recent
method by [10].
There have been several directions for defenses to test-
time attacks, but we mainly focus on preprocessing defenses.
In such defenses, one designs a preprocessing function T :
RH×W×C 7→ RH×W×C , and with a base model F , the end-
to-end predictions are produced as F (T (·)). In this context
there are three types of attacks: (1) Black Box Attack where
the attacker can only get zero-order information of F (i.e. the
outputs of F correspond to the given inputs), (2) Gray Box
Attack where the attacker knows F , but is unaware of T , and
(3) White Box Attack where the attacker knows both F and
T . This paper considers white-box attacks since this is the
strongest attack model.
Given a preprocessing technique T , the goal of an adversary
is thus to find another image z such that ‖z − x ‖ ≤ ε and
F (T (z)) 6= F (T (x)).
B. Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA) Attack
Introduced recently by Athalye et al. [10], the backward
pass differentiable approximation (BPDA) attack is a white-box
attack that assumes the knowledge of both the classifier F
and the preprocessor T . The BPDA-attack, given an input and
a target label, computes adversarial perturbations by gradient
descent over F (T (·)). The main problem that BPDA solves
is that many preprocessing techniques “obfuscate gradients”
by using a T that is not differentiable or is random. BPDA
addresses this issue by using F (T (·)) for the forward pass
but switching to a “differentiable approximation” of T when
computing gradients for the backward pass.
C. Adversarial Training
We briefly describe the technique of adversarial training. For
detailed account the reader is referred to [15]. Roughly speaking
adversarial training works as follows: before processing data
x (e.g. using it in an iteration of stochastic-gradient descent
(SGD)) we apply an algorithm for crafting adversarial examples,
such as BPDA, and obtain an adversarial example x∗. The
learning algorithm uses x∗ instead of x. The theoretical
underpinnings of adversarial training can be found in robust
optimization.
D. Metrics and Definitions
We now provide the necessary definitions that are used in
our work.
Definition 1 (Accuracy). Accuracy of a classifier F is defined
as
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[F (x) = y]
Definition 2 (Local robustness predicate). Given an image x,
the condition for an adversary with budget ε to not succeed is
defined as the following predicate:
Rε(x, y) ≡ {F (T (z)) = y for any ‖z− x ‖ ≤ ε}
We call this predicate the robustness predicate.
Definition 3 (Local certificate). A predicate P (x, y) is called
a local certificate iff P (x, y) implies Rε(x, y). In other words,
if P (x, y) is true then it provides a proof of the robustness at
x.
Definition 4 (Robustness accuracy). The following quantity is
called robustness accuracy
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[F (T (z)) = y for any ‖z− x ‖ ≤ ε]
= Pr
(x,y)∼D
[Rε(x, y)]
Robustness accuracy is the measure of robustness across the
entire probability distribution. This quantity is the accuracy
under the strongest attack. However, we cannot measure it
directly in experiments. We instead measure the accuracy under
the attacks we perform as an estimation of robustness accuracy.
In general, any norm can be used for the attack distance
metric‖ · ‖ used in the definitions above. We specifically use
the `∞ norm (‖ · ‖∞) for all discussions and results in this
paper. The `∞ norm is defined as
‖u‖∞ = max
i
|ui|
where u is a vector (u1, · · · , un). Throughout this paper, any
mention of the norm means `∞ norm.
E. Datasets
We use a variety of simple and complex datasets to
understand the interaction of pixel discretization and adversarial
attacks.
a) MNIST and Fashion-MNIST: The MNIST dataset [11]
is a large dataset of handwritten digits. Each digit has 5,000
training images and 1,000 test images. Each image is a 28x28
grayscale with the pixel color-depth of 8 bits.
The MNIST dataset is largely considered a simple dataset,
so we also consider a slightly more complex dataset called
Fashion-MNIST [16]. Images in this dataset depicts wearables
such as shirts and boots instead of digits. The image format,
the number of classes, as well as the number of examples are
all identical to MNIST.
b) CIFAR-10: The CIFAR-10 dataset [13] is also a dataset
of 32x32 color images with ten classes, each consisting of 5,000
training images and 1,000 test images. The classes correspond
to dogs, frogs, ships, trucks, etc.
c) GTSRB: The German Traffic Sign Recognition Bench-
mark (GTSRB) [17] is a dataset of color images depicting 43
different traffic signs. The images are not of a fixed dimensions
and have rich background and varying light conditions as would
be expected of photographed images of traffic signs. There are
about 39,000 training images and 12,000 test images.
Some of the images in the dataset are very dark, making
it difficult to identify the right features in the images. This
makes adversarial perturbations on them easier. Therefore, we
remove all images that have an average intensity of less than
50.
d) ImageNet: ImageNet [18] is a complex dataset with
over 14 million images and twenty thousand categories. We use
the subset of ImageNet used by the NIPS Adversarial Attacks
& Defenses Challenge [19], which contains 1000 development
images and 5000 test images from 1001 categories.
F. Experiment Settings
a) Pre-trained Models: For MNIST and CIFAR-10, we
use naturally and adversarially pre-trained models from [15].
For ImageNet, we use a naturally pre-trained InceptionResNet-
V2 model from [20] and an adversarially pre-trained
InceptionResNet-V2 model from [21].
b) Training Hyper-parameters.: For MNIST and CIFAR-
10, we use the same training hyper-parameters as [15]. To
train models on Fashion-MNIST, we use the same hyper-
parameters as those we use to train MNIST. And the same
hyper-parameters as those used on CIFAR-10 are used to train
models on GTSRB. In order to reduce training time, when we
naturally (or adversarially) retrain models, we use naturally (or
adversarially) pre-trained model to initialize model parameters
and train for 10000 epochs.
c) Attack Methods: If gradient approximation is needed,
we use the BPDA attack, otherwise we use the PGD attack.
For MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, we set ε = 0.3 and use 100
steps for the attack. For CIFAR-10, when we use naturally
trained model as base model, we set ε = 2 and use 40 steps
attack; when we use adversarially trained model, we set ε = 8
and use 40 steps. For GTSRB, we set ε = 8 and use 40 steps.
For ImageNet, when we use naturally trained model as based
model, we set ε = 1 and use 1 steps attack; when we use
adversarially trained model, we set ε = 4 and use 10 steps for
the attack.
III. ROBUSTNESS OF COLOR-DEPTH REDUCTION
We begin by discussing a simple pixel discretization tech-
nique as described by Xu et al. [5], a prototypical example of
pixel discretization defenses. They describe their techniques
as “feature squeezing”, which are preprocessing techniques
intended to condense a number of features into a smaller
number of features. The intuition is that by giving an adversary
a smaller space from which to select features, it will make
performing an adversarial attack difficult. One of their feature
squeezing techniques is color-depth reduction. This is a “simple
binning” approach where, for example, a 256-bin color channel
(as represented by 8 bits) may be quantized to a 8-bin color
channel. Color values are essentially "rounded" to their nearest
color bins.
On an image x, we can do k-bin discretization via the
following function:
T (x)[i, j, l] =
b(k − 1)x[i, j, l] + 0.5c
k − 1
Where, i ∈ [H], j ∈ [W ] and l ∈ [C]. Here, [H] =
{1, 2, · · · , H}. This assumes that the pixel values of the input
image have been scaled to be in [0, 1].
Evaluation. As mentioned by Athalye et al. in their BPDA
attack paper, color-depth reduction can be attacked by ap-
proximating the preprocessing function T with the identity
function. Below we reproduce these results with a more
sophisticated differentiable approximation of T and provide
details of the robustness on different datasets. We will also use
this approximation later in the paper when we discuss more
sophisticated data-specific pixel discretization.
In our evaluation of color-depth reduction using the BPDA
method, we compute F (T (x)) in the forward pass, while for
the backward pass, we replace T (x) by g(x), which is:
g(x)[i, j, l] =
∑k
t=1 ct · e−α‖x[i,j,l]−ct‖∑k
t=1 e
−α‖x[i,j,l]−ct‖
.
where i ∈ [H], j ∈ [W ], l ∈ [C] and ct = t−1k−1 . Note that
when α→∞, g(x) = T (x). For MNIST and Fashion-MNIST,
we set α = 10. For other datasets, we set α = 0.1. To evaluate
classifier’s robustness without discretization, we use the PGD
attack. We define natural accuracy, or simply accuracy, as the
accuracy on clean data. Similarly, robustness accuracy, which
we denote as robustness, is the accuracy under attack.
Results. We present results on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST,
CIFAR-10, GTSRB and ImageNet datasets as shown in Table I.
Our intention is to see if we can achieve sufficient robustness
while maintaining accuracy on these datasets through color-
depth reduction.
For MNIST, as Xu et al. showed, we obtain good accuracy
with just 2 bins. As can be seen from the table, we obtain a
substantial improvement in both the naturally trained model and
the adversarially trained model. The results are also very good
for Fashion-MNIST. This is somewhat expected as MNIST
and Fashion-MNIST are similar datasets.
We also obtain results on CIFAR-10, GTSRB and ImageNet.
We present detailed results with different bins. As can be seen
from the table, color-depth reduction does not substantially
improve robustness under whitebox attacks.
The difference in robustness results for MNIST-like simple
datasets and for other datasets is due to the complexity of the
datasets. In Section V, we will further investigate this issue. We
next try data-specific pixel discretization, which may possibly
improve robustness over complex datasets.
IV. DATA-SPECIFIC PIXEL DISCRETIZATION
The fact that the simple binning does not work naturally
leads to the question whether one can design more sophisticated
discretization schemes with better performance. In particular,
a reason why simple binning fails is that it does not take
into account the properties of the data. Consider the following
intentionally simplified setting: each image has just one pixel
x taking values in [0, 1], and images of class 0 lie close
to 0.6 and those of class 1 lie close to 1. Using simple
binning with codewords {0, 1} then fails, as the images will
all be discretized to 1. This example then motivates more
sophisticated approaches that takes into account the distribution
of the data, so as to improve robustness over simple binning
by color-depth reduction. Our approach in this section is data-
specific: we aim to discretize pixels in a way that takes the
density of pixels in the dataset into account. We wish to derive
a codebook of pixels from the dataset, which is used by T that
replaced each pixel with its nearest codeword under a suitable
distance metric.
We begin by describing our framework for codebook
construction and then present our experimental results on data-
specific discretization.
A. Preprocessing Framework and Codebook Construction
At the high level, our framework is very simple and has the
following two steps:
1) At training time, we construct a codebook C =
{c1, c2, · · · , ck} for some k, where ci is in the pixel
space. This codebook C is then fixed during test time.
2) Given an image x at test time, T replaces each pixel
x[i, j] with a codeword c ∈ C that has minimal distance
to x[i, j].
Intuitively, on one hand, we would like to have a set of codes
that are far apart from each other, similar to the requirements
of error correcting codes in coding theory, such that even after
adversarial perturbation the discretized result will not change.
On the other hand, we would like to lose little information so
that we can keep a high accuracy after discretization. More
precisely, a set of good codes should satisfy the following
properties:
• Separability. Pairwise distances of codewords is large
enough for certain distance metric.
Dataset Base Model k Pre-trained Re-trained
MNIST Naturally Trained
Model
Accuracy Robustness Accuracy Robustness
2 98.76% 75.39% 99.09% 80.91%
256 99.17% 0.00% N/A
Adversarially
Trained Model
2 98.18% 97.32% 98.49% 92.89%
256 98.40% 92.72% N/A
Fashion-MNIST
Naturally Trained
Model
2 98.97% 78.05% 99.15% 82.11%
256 99.10% 0.00% N/A
Adversarially
Trained Model
2 98.38% 95.78% 98.74% 92.32%
256 98.53% 87.38% N/A
CIFAR-10
Naturally Trained
Model
2 38.30% 18.05% 80.38% 46.44%
8 83.66% 9.12% 92.27% 28.13%
16 92.71% 6.72% 94.22% 13.84%
32 94.40% 4.51% 94.81% 6.10%
256 95.01% 4.20% N/A
Adversarially
Trained Model
2 74.59% 34.30% 78.35% 38.32%
8 86.51% 46.80% 87.24% 46.89%
16 87.09% 47.11% 87.65% 47.18%
32 87.20% 47.20% 87.60% 47.13%
256 87.25% 45.50% N/A
GTSRB
Naturally Trained
Model
2 61.91% 32.12% 68.70% 29.60%
8 95.06% 18.28% 95.39% 18.47%
16 97.15% 13.88% 97.15% 14.98%
32 97.34% 9.93% 97.43% 10.02%
256 97.35% 7.83% N/A
Adversarially
Trained Model
2 68.43% 55.55% 70.93% 55.30%
8 93.08% 74.46% 93.80% 74.90%
16 93.85% 75.66% 94.96% 76.65%
32 94.02% 75.45% 94.92% 76.20%
256 94.11% 74.34% N/A
ImageNet
Naturally Trained
Model
2 50.80% 24.40%
8 88.10% 30.80%
16 92.80% 30.60%
32 94.40% 27.30%
256 94.50% 27.50% N/A
Adversarially
Trained Model
2 56.20% 11.90%
8 94.00% 12.90%
16 96.10% 11.80%
32 96.40% 8.40%
256 96.40% 5.20%
TABLE I: Results on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR-10, GTSRB and ImageNet with color-depth reduction. k is the number
of bins. k = 256 means we use all possible codes in the input space, that is we don’t discretize images.
• Representativity. There exists a classifier F that has good
accuracy on the discretized data based on C, as described
by the framework above.
Therefore, one may want to apply common clustering
algorithms, such as k-means and k-medoids, to find such
separable codes. Note however, that these algorithms do not
make a guarantee of separability. In search for separability, we
therefore try both k-medoids and another algorithm that we
develop based on density estimation. We next describe the two
algorithms.
1) Density Estimation-based Algorithm: We devise a new
algorithm to construct separable codes based on density
estimation and greedy selection on all the pixels P in the
training data. This algorithm is described in Algorithm 1. This
algorithm takes as input a set of images D, a kernel function
for density estimation, and number of codes k and a distance
parameter r. It repeats k times and at each time, first estimates
the densities for all pixel values, then adds the one with highest
density to the codebook, and finally, remove all pixels within
r distance of the picked.
Algorithm 1 DERIVING CODES VIA DENSITY ESTIMATION
Input: A training dataset D, distance parameter r and number
of codewords k, a kernel function ρ(·, ·).
Output: a set of codewords C = {c1, c2, · · · , ck}.
1: Let P denote all the pixels from images in D.
2: for i = 1, 2, · · · , k do
3: For each pixel value v, estimate its (unnormalized)
density as h[v] =
∑
p∈P ρ(p, v).
4: Set ci ← arg maxv h[v], and P ← P − {p ∈ P :
‖p− ci‖ ≤ r}.
5: end for
Instantiation. There are many possible kernel functions we
can use to instantiate Algorithm 1. In this work we use the
simplest choice, the identity kernel, ρ(p1, p2) = 1 if p1 = p2
and 0 otherwise. In that case, the density estimation at line
3 above becomes counting the frequencies of a pixel v in P .
The values of k and r can be tuned and we will report results
for different choices of these parameters.
Algorithm 2 DERIVING CODES VIA k-MEDOIDS
Input: A training dataset D, number of codewords k, number
of iterations T , a distance function d(·, ·).
Output: a set of codewords C = {c1, c2, · · · , ck}.
1: Let P denote all the pixels from images in D.
2: For any set of codewords C, define the k-medoid cost (w.r.t.
to the distance function d) as
cost(P, C) =
∑
p∈P
min
c′∈C
d(p, c′).
3: Randomly pick k pixels as the initial medoids C =
{c1, c2, · · · , ck}.
4: for t = 1, 2, · · · , T do
5: for Each pixel p 6∈ C and each c ∈ C do
6: Let Cc,p = C \ {c} ∪ {p}
7: if cost(P, Cc,p) < cost(P, C) then
8: Set C ← Cc,p
9: end if
10: end for
11: end for
2) k-Medoids Algorithm: The k-medoids algorithm is simi-
lar to the k-means algorithm and aims to minimize the distance
between points inside a cluster to the cluster centroid, a point
in the cluster, which is representative of the entire cluster. The
parameter k is an input to the algorithm (a hyperparameter).
The algorithm works as follows: we initially select k points
from the given data points as the medoids. Each point is then
associated with the closest medoid. The cost of the association
is calculated as the sum of pairwise distance between each
point and its medoid. The algorithm then iteratively continues
by switching a medoid with another data point and checking
if this switch of medoids reduces the cost. See Algorithm 2
for the details.
Typically, the `1 distance, also called the Manhattan distance,
is used as the distance metric, and is also the distance used
in our experiments. If `2 distance (the Euclidean distance)
is used, the algorithm reduces to the commonly named k-
median algorithm. A third option is `∞ distance. Experimental
results show that using `2 and `∞ distances lead to similar
performance as `1, so we only report those results for `1.
Finally, one can use the popular k-means algorithm for
constructing the codewords. However, it is known to be
sensitive to outliers, and indeed leads to worse performance
in our experiments. So we do not include experimental results
using the k-means algorithm.
We now present experimental results using the algorithms
using density estimation and k-medoids.
B. Experimental Results
We now present our evaluation of data-specific discretization.
Since these approaches are more sophisticated than simple
color-depth reduction, it is possible for these approaches
to yield robust behavior for a wide range of datasets. To
summarize this section, however, our key findings are negative:
data-specific discretization techniques do not provide much
robustness to complex datasets such as CIFAR-10, GTSRB
and ImageNet.
Our experimental setup is similar to that of the previous
experiments. We use the same differentiable approximation
to T , with ci this time being the codewords derived from
our algorithms and performing operations on pixel space. Our
experiments consist of the following three parts:
• We would like to evaluate the effectiveness of the specifi-
cally designed code construction Algorithm 1 on different
datasets. We would also like to check the variation of
robustness as we change the adversarial budget ε.
• As in the color-depth reduction experiments, we would
also like to understand how the preprocessing technique
provides robustness on different datasets quantitatively as
we vary the number of codewords.
• Finally, we would like to see how the k-Medoid algorithm
for codebook construction affects the performance.
Effectivenss. We now evaluate the robustness obtained by pixel
discretization using the codebook constructed by Algorithm 1
on different datasets. We consider six settings:
1) nat_pre: no defenses, model naturally trained on original
data;
2) adv_pre: no defenses, model adversarially trained on
original data;
3) disc_nat_pre: discretization defense + model naturally
trained on original data;
4) disc_adv_pre: discretization defense + model adversari-
ally trained on original data;
5) disc_nat_re: discretization defense + model naturally
trained on preprocessed data;
6) disc_adv_re: discretization defense + model adversarially
trained on preprocessed data.
We further vary the adversarial budget ε to give a more complete
evaluation of the method.
Figure 1, 2, and 3 show the results on the five datasets, with
varying ε. We observe that on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, the
method improves over the naturally trained model significantly,
and further improves the adversarially trained models. The
improvements with discretization are however still minor for
datasets other than MNIST and Fashion-MNIST.
We also confirm the so-called adversarial generalization gap
phenomenon previously reported in [22], that is, there is a
big gap between training and test robustness accuracy. This
suggests there is not sufficient data for improving the robustness.
The right subfigure in Figure 3 shows this gap on CIFAR-10.
In general, the results suggest that for complex datasets (such
as CIFAR-10, GTSRB, and ImageNet), it is difficult to achieve
robustness via pixel discretization. This is potentially because
the separability and representativity conditions of codewords
cannot be satisfied simultaneously due to the data lacking good
structure and the base model having peculiar properties. In
Sections V, we will study in detail the failure of the method.
Effect of Number of Codewords. Given the results, one may
wonder whether the performance can be improved by tuning the
Dataset Base Model k r Pre-trained Re-trained
MNIST
Naturally Trained
Model
Accuracy Robustness Accuracy Robustness
2 0.6 98.81% 75.35% 99.15% 80.91%
256 N/A 99.17% 0.00% N/A
Adversarially
Trained Model
2 0.6 98.17% 97.24% 98.56% 92.80%
256 N/A 98.40% 92.72% N/A
Fashion-MNIST
Naturally Trained
Model
2 0.6 98.81% 75.35% 98.93% 79.93%
256 N/A 99.10% 0.00% N/A
Adversarially
Trained Model
2 0.6 98.17% 97.24% 98.56% 92.55%
256 N/A 98.53% 87.38% N/A
CIFAR-10
Naturally Trained
Model
2 64 24.20% 15.90% 68.50% 46.70%
5 64 39.60% 18.70% 79.90% 46.00%
10 64 42.70% 16.40% 81.60% 43.40%
50 48 67.70% 12.50% 89.70% 37.10%
100 16 86.30% 7.60% 92.80% 23.90%
300 16 91.30% 7.60% 94.40% 20.50%
500 16 91.21% 9.01% 93.53% 19.81%
2563 N/A 95.01% 4.20% N/A
Adversarially
Trained Model
2 64 63.20% 24.40% 68.30% 33.20%
5 64 76.10% 33.40% 78.70% 40.20%
10 64 78.30% 34.70% 81.00% 43.80%
50 48 84.30% 39.50% 84.80% 43.80%
100 16 86.00% 42.50% 85.40% 44.40%
300 16 87.30% 46.90% 86.80% 46.60%
500 16 86.99% 46.77% 87.60% 46.84%
2563 N/A 87.25% 45.50% N/A
GTSRB
Naturally Trained
Model
2 64 44.02% 23.94% 55.39% 29.46%
5 64 66.65% 21.11% 80.55% 25.42%
10 64 80.51% 27.80% 84.75% 23.87%
50 48 90.01% 26.42% 91.48% 23.12%
100 16 96.62% 16.45% 96.45% 17.91%
300 16 96.80% 16.22% 96.84% 17.08%
500 16 96.82% 15.49% 96.80% 16.25%
2563 N/A 97.35% 7.83% N/A
Adversarially
Trained Model
2 64 54.79% 43.18% 58.53% 43.94%
5 64 74.56% 53.88% 81.43% 58.52%
10 64 85.83% 66.84% 85.93% 67.36%
50 48 91.09% 74.26% 91.34% 74.48%
100 16 93.97% 74.74% 94.72% 76.06%
300 16 93.96% 75.31% 94.78% 76.18%
500 16 93.98% 75.54% 94.73% 76.66%
2563 N/A 94.11% 74.34% N/A
ImageNet
Naturally Trained
Model
10 64 53.90% 23.00%
50 48 77.10% 28.50%
100 16 88.40% 32.40%
200 16 89.50% 32.80%
300 16 89.30% 34.80%
500 16 92.10% 34.10%
2563 N/A 94.50% 27.50% N/A
Adversarially
Trained Model
10 64 62.60% 7.50%
50 48 85.30% 11.20%
100 16 92.80% 12.00%
200 16 94.00% 13.30%
300 16 94.20% 14.10%
500 16 94.80% 16.00%
2563 N/A 96.40% 5.20%
TABLE II: Results on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR-10, GTSRB and ImageNet with data-specific pixel discretization. We
derive codes via density estimation. k and r are hyper-parameters used to find the codes. k = 256 in MNIST and Fashion-MNIST
and k = 2563 in CIFAR-10, GTSRB and ImageNet mean we use all possible codes in the input space, that is we don’t discretize
images.
Fig. 1: Results on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST using 2 codes under 100 steps attack. The method significantly improves
robustness on naturally pre-trained model and adversarially pre-trained model.
(a) (b)
Fig. 2: Results on GTSRB and ImageNet. (a) Results on GTSRB using 50 codes under 40 steps attack. On the naturally
trained model, our method could improve its robustness. However, there is little improvement in robustness on the adversarially
pretrained model. (b) The results on ImageNet using 300 codes under 10 steps attack. The method slightly improves robustness
on either naturally pre-trained models or adversarially pre-trained models.
parameters of the code construction Algorithm 1, in particular,
the number of codewords k. Here, we study the relationship
between number of codewords and accuracy and robustness.
Table II shows the results on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR-
10, GTSRB and ImageNet dataset. For MNIST and Fashion-
MNIST, we only report results using 2 codewords since we can
achieve very good accuracy and robustness using 2 codewords.
For other dataset, we report results on a range of k.
From the results, we can know without attacks, high
accuracies can be achieved with only a few number of
codewords (e.g., 100), especially when models are retrained.
On naturally trained models, with fewer codewords, we gain
more robustness. This is because the distances between the
codewords are larger and it is harder for the attacker to change
the discretization results. On adversarially trained models, an
increasing number of codewords leads to better robustness. This
is different from the naturally trained case, potentially because
the the data points are further away from the decision boundary
of adversarially trained models, and thus increasing number
of codes does not make it easier for the attacker to change
the discretization outcome while giving more representativity
Fig. 3: Results on CIFAR-10 using 50 codes under 40 steps attack. (a) On the naturally trained model, the method could
improve its robustness. On the adversarially trained model, there is little improvement so we omit the plot. Instead, we plot the
adversarial gap underlying this failure. (b) Adversarial gap phenomenon on CIFAR-10. When we adversarially retrain the model
on discretized images, we can achieve nearly 100% robustness in training but no higher than 50% in test. This is referred to as
an adversarial generalization gap [22].
Dataset Base Model k Pre-trained Re-trained
MNIST Naturally Trained Model
Accuracy Robustness Accuracy Robustness
2 98.81% 75.43% 98.99% 80.66%
Adversarially Trained Model 2 98.17% 97.20% 98.50% 92.20%
Fashion-MNIST Naturally Trained Mode 2 98.85% 76.42% 99.00% 81.23%Adversarially Trained Model 2 98.14% 97.21% 98.52% 92.72%
CIFAR-10 Naturally Trained Model 300 92.73% 8.56% 93.91% 17.08%Adversarially Trained Model 300 86.97% 46.68% 87.53% 47.11%
GTSRB Naturally Trained Model 300 97.31% 14.61% 97.39% 15.02%Adversarially Trained Model 300 93.98% 75.56% 95.06% 76.46%
ImageNet Naturally Trained Model 300 92.30% 33.80% N/AAdversarially Trained Model 300 94.90% 12.20%
TABLE III: Results on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR-10, GTSRB and ImageNet with data-specific pixel discretization. We
derive codes via k-medoids. k is the number of medoids.
leading to better results. This also means that discretization
does not lead to significantly change in the robustness. This
is confirmed by observing that adversarially trained models
without discretization can get 45.60% robustness on CIFAR-10.
This is further investigated in Section V.
Using k-Medoids. Finally, we also try k-medoids algorithm
for generating the codebook. As mentioned, using `2 or `∞
distances leads to similar performance as `1, so we report only
the results for `1 in Table III. As is quite clear from the table,
the results are on par with the results when using the density
estimation algorithm. With MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, this
is somewhat obvious as both algorithms select codewords at
or close to 0 and 1. With other dataset, while not so obvious,
the accuracy and robustness still remain similar to those with
the codebook construction algorithm via density estimation.
V. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
In this section we address the following question: when
does pixel discretization work? Experimental results show that
the pixel discretization defense methods can achieve strong
performance on the MNIST data set and alike, but fail on
more complex data sets, such as CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. A
better understanding of the conditions under which the simple
framework will succeed can help us identify scenarios where
our technique is applicable, and also provide insights on how
to design better defense methods.
We aim at obtaining better insights into its success by the
pursuing two lines of studies. First, we propose a theoretical
model of the distribution of the pixels in the images and
then prove that in this model the pixel discretization provably
works. Second, inspired by our theoretical analysis, we propose
a method to compute a certificate for the performance of the
defense method on given images and a given adversarial budget.
This certificate is the lower bound of the performance for any
attacks using a given adversarial budget. If the certified robust
accuracy is high, then it means that the defense is successful
for any attack within the budget, not just for existing. This is
much desired in practice, especially considering that new and
stronger attacks are frequently recently proposed for DNNs.
The certificate, as a lower bound, also allows a rough estimation
of the performance, when combined with the robust accuracy
under the currently available attacks which is an upper bound.
1) An idealized model and its analysis: To garner additional
insights, we propose and analyze an idealized model under
which we can precisely analyze when the adversarial robust-
ness can be improved by pixel discretization method using
codewords constructed by Algorithm 1.
In the center of our analysis is a generative model for images,
i.e., a probabilistic model of the distributions of the images.
Roughly speaking, in this model, we assumes that there exists
some “ground-truth” codewords that are well separated, and the
pixels of the images are slight perturbations of these codewords,
and thus form well separated clusters. This idealized model
of the images are directly inspired by the known clustering
structure of the pixels in the MNIST data set, i.e., most pixels
from MNIST are either close to 1 or close to 0. Given such
a clustering structure, the codeword construction algorithm
(Algorithm 1) can find codewords that are good approximations
of the ground-truth codewords, and the adversarial attacks
cannot change the discretization results much. In summary,
our analysis results suggest the following: Suppose that data
is good in the sense that it can be “generated” using some
“ground-truth” codewords that are sufficiently well separated;
then, as long as we can find a ν-approximation for the ground
truth codewords and we have a base model F that is robust
with respect to the ν-budget, it follows F (T (·)) is immune
to any adversarial attack with a small budget ε ≤ 5ν, thus
providing a boost of adversarial robustness. Or in other words,
pre-processing provides a 5x boost on adversarial robustness.
We now present details.
An idealized generative model of images. Each image x is
viewed as a d-dimensional array (a typical image of width
W and height H can be flattened into an array of dimension
W ×H). Suppose each pixel x[i] is 3-dimensional vector of
discrete values in [K]. Assume that there is a set of ground-truth
codewords C∗ = {c∗1, . . . , c∗k}, where the codewords c∗i ∈ [K]3
lies in the same space as the pixels. Also, assume that the
codewords are well separated so that ‖c∗i − c∗j‖ ≥ Γ for some
large Γ.
Now we specify the generative process of an image. Each
image is generated in two steps, by first generating a “skeleton
image” u where each pixel is a codeword, and then adding
noise to the skeleton. We do not make assumptions about the
distribution of the label y. Formally,
1) u is generated from some distribution over (C∗)d, where
the marginal distributions satisfy
1
d
∑
j∈[d]
Pr(uj = c∗i ) =
1
k
,∀i ∈ [k].
2) x[i] = u[i] + ζi, where ζi takes valid discrete values so
that x[i] ∈ [K]3, and
‖ζi‖ ≤ Γ/8, and Pr[‖ζi‖ = t] = α exp(−t2/σ2)
where t takes valid discrete values, σ is a parameter, and
α is a normalization factor.
We would like to make a few comments about our generative
model. First, the assumption on the skeleton u is very mild,
since the only requirement is that the probability of seeing any
codeword is the same 1/k, i.e., randomly pick a pixel in u and
it is equal to any codeword with the same probability. This
is to make sure that we have enough pixels coming from any
codeword in the training data, so this condition can be relaxed
to 1d
∑
j∈[d] Pr(uj = c
∗
i ) ≥ εc for a small εc. We set εc = 1/k
for simplicity of the presentation.
For the second step of the generative process, the assumptions
that the noise ζi takes discrete values and that ‖ζi‖ ≤ Γ/8
are also for simplicity. The actually needed assumption is that
with high probability, the noise is small compared to Γ, the
separation between the ground-truth codewords.
Quantifying robustness. We now prove our main theoretical
result in the idealized model.
As a first step, we first show that the codewords constructed
are quite close to the ground-truth. Formally, we say that a
set of codewords {c1, . . . , ck} is a ν-approximation of C∗ if
for any i, ‖ci − c∗i ‖ ≤ ν. For the above generative model,
one can show that the codewords found by Algorithm 1 are
ν-approximation of the ground truth C∗.
Lemma 1. Let N denote the number of pixels in the training
set. For any δ > 0, if Γ > 16ν where ν is defined as in
Proposition 1, then with probability at least 1− δ, Algorithm 1
with r = 2ν outputs a set of codes C = {c1, . . . , ck} such that
‖ci − c∗i ‖ ≤ ν, ∀i.
Proof. Let x denote a pixel in the generated images. We have
for any i, Pr[x = c∗i ] ≥ α/k, and for any c such that ‖c−c∗i ‖ ≥
ν for all i, Pr[x = c] ≤ α exp(−ν2/σ2). By Hoeffding’s
inequality [23, Section 2.6], with probability at least 1− δ, the
empirical estimations satisfy
P̂r[x = c∗i ] ≥ α/k − γ,
P̂r[x = c] ≤ α exp(−ν2/σ2) + γ.
Then P̂r[x = c∗i ] > P̂r[x = c]. Note that r = 2ν and Γ > 16ν,
so for each c∗i , Algorithm 1 picks a code from the neighborhood
around c∗i of radius ν exactly once. This completes the proof.
Our main result, Proposition 1, then follows from Lemma 1.
To state the result, let us call a transformation G to be a
ν-code perturbation of C∗ if given any skeleton u, G(u)
replaces any c∗i in it with a code c
′
i satisfying ‖c′i − c∗i ‖ ≤ ν.
With this definition we show that, on an image attacked with
adversarial budget ε ≤ 5ν, our discretization T will output a
ν-code perturbation on u. Lemma 1 then leads to the following
proposition (proof is straightforward).
Proposition 1. Assume the idealized generative model, and
Γ > 16ν where
ν = σ
√
log
1
1/k − 2γ/α, γ =
√
4
N
log
K
δ
, (1)
where N is the number of pixels in the training dataset. Assume
r = 2ν in Algorithm 1. Then for any ε ≤ 5ν,
Pr(x,u,y)[F (T (z)) = y for any ‖z− x ‖ ≤ ε]
≥ min
G
Pr(x,u,y)[F (G(u)) = y]
with probability at least 1 − δ, where the minimum is taken
over all ν-code perturbation G.
Essentially, this proposition says that one can “reduce”
defending against 5ν adversarial attacks to defending against
ν-code perturbations G. Therefore, as long as one has a base
model F that is robust to small structured perturbation (i.e.,
the ν-code perturbation), then one can defend against any 5ν
adversarial attacks, which is a significant boost of robustness.
Indeed, we observed that the intuition is consistent with the
experimental results: the method gives better performance using
an adversarially trained F (·), than a naturally trained F , on
structured data like MNIST.
This analysis also inspires the following simple approach
for computing a certificate of the robust accuracy for a set of
codewords on given images and a given adversarial budget.
2) Certification for discretization defense: The analysis
shows that the method succeeds when the adversarial attack
cannot cause significant changes after discretization, and the
base model is robust to the slight change in the discretized
image. In fact, the intuition is also applicable to general cases
beyond the idealized model. In particular, one can empirically
check if such conditions are met when the images, the base
model, and the adversarial budget are all given. This observation
then gives our algorithm for computing the certificate for the
defense method.
Now we formally derive the certificates for the defense.
Given the codewords C = {c1, c2, . . . , ck} used in the pixel
discretization, for a pixel x[i], let c∗(x[i]) denote its nearest
code in C, and define
C(x[i]) = {c : ‖x[i]− c‖ < ‖c∗(x[i])− x[i]‖+ 2ε} (2)
where ε is the adversarial budget.
Then after perturbation δ bounded by ε, the distance between
the perturbed pixel x[i] + δ and c∗(x[i]) is
‖x[i] + δ − c∗(x[i])‖ ≤ ‖x[i]− c∗(x[i])‖+ ‖δ‖
≤ ‖x[i]− c∗(x[i])‖+ ε
by the triangle inequality. On the other hand, the distance
between the perturbed pixel x[i] + δ and any c 6∈ C(x[i]) is
‖x[i] + δ − c‖ ≥ ‖x[i]− c‖ − ‖δ‖
≥ ‖x[i]− c‖ − ε.
By the definition of C(x[i]), we know that
‖x[i]− c‖ − ε > ‖x[i]− c∗(x[i])‖+ ε.
So after perturbation, the pixel x[i] + δ can only be discretized
to a code in C(x[i]).
Then all possible outcomes of the discretization after
perturbation are
S(x) = {z = (z[1], . . . , z[d]) : z[i] ∈ C(x[i])}. (3)
This then leads to the following local certificate for a given
image, and global certificate for the whole distribution.
Local certificate. For a data point (x, y), if for any z ∈ S(x)
we have F (z) = y, then it is guaranteed that x is correctly
classified by F (T (·)) to y even under the adversarial attack
with ε-budget. Formally, let IF (x, y) be the indicator that
F (z) = y for all z ∈ S(x), then
IF (x, y) = I[F (z) = y,∀z ∈ S(x)]
≤ I[F (T (z)) = y for any ‖z− x ‖ ≤ ε], (4)
so IF (x, y) is a lower bound on the robust accuracy for this
data point. It serves as a local certificate for (x, y).
Global certificate. Define s = E(x,y)∼D[IF (x, y)]. Then
clearly, we have
s ≤ Pr
(x,y)∼D
[F (T (z)) = y for any ‖z− x ‖ ≤ ε],
so s serves as a lower bound for the robustness accuracy of
the defense on the whole data distribution.
Of course, computing the exact value of s is not feasible,
as it requires access to the true data distribution. Fortunately,
this certificate s can be easily estimated on a validation set of
data points. Even with a medium number of samples we can
compute an estimation sˆ∗ that is with high probability a close
lower bound of s. Formally, applying a standard concentration
bound (in particular, the Hoeffding’s inequality) leads to the
following.
Proposition 2. Let sˆ be the fraction of IF (x, y) = 1 on a set
V of m i.i.d. samples from the data distribution. Then with
probability at least 1− δ over V ,
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[F (T (z)) = y for any ‖z− x ‖ ≤ ε]
≥ sˆ∗ :=
(
1−
√
1
2m
log
1
δ
)
sˆ.
Note that computing the certificate needs enumerating S(x)
that can be of exponential size. However, when the pixels are
well clustered, most of them are much closer to their nearest
code than to the others, and thus will not be discretized to
a new code after perturbation, i.e., |C(x[i])| = 1. Then S(x)
is of small size and the certificate is easy to compute. This
is indeed the case on the MNIST data, which allows us to
compute the estimated certificate sˆ in our experiments.
3) Certifying robustness on datasets: Here we compute the
certificate derived above on real world data sets, including
MNIST and others. It is expected that the certificate can
be computed in reasonable time on well structured data like
MNIST, while it may not be efficiently computed or provide
no useful lower bound for other less structured data sets.
ε b Unable Success(sˆ) Fail sˆ∗
0.00 0 0.0% 98.1% 1.9% 96.61%
0.05 30 0.43% 97.43% 2.14% 95.95%
0.10 30 1.3% 96.43% 2.27% 94.97%
0.15 26 29.18% 69.01% 1.81% 67.96%
0.20 25 74.38% 24.96% 0.66% 24.58%
0.25 25 89.48% 10.37% 0.15% 10.21%
0.30 25 95.67% 4.31% 0.02% 4.24%
TABLE IV: Certificate results on MNIST for different adversar-
ial budget ε. For computational reasons, we set a threshold b,
and if |S(x)| > 2b where S(x) is defined in Eqn (3), we report
it as an Unable case. sˆ and sˆ∗ are defined in Proposition 2.
Fig. 4: Certificate results on MNIST for the codewords
constructed by Algorithm 1, compared to the empirical result
without defense (nat_pre), and the empirical result with defense
(disc_adv_pre). We plot two certificate results: estimated
certificate on test images sˆ, and global certificate sˆ∗, as defined
in Proposition 2. Also see Table IV for the detailed numbers.
MNIST Certificate. We compute the estimated certificate (sˆ
in in Proposition 2) on 10000 test images of MNIST for the
codewords constructed by Algorithm 1. We also compute the
global certificate (sˆ∗ in Proposition 2) for the same set of
codewords, where the failure probability δ is set to be 0.01.
For computational reasons we set up a threshold b and for
x with |S(x)| > 2b where S(x) is defined in (3), we report
Unable and treat them as failure cases when computing the
certificates.
Our results are provided in Table IV, and exact values of
sˆ and sˆ∗ are compared with experimental results in Figure 4.
There exists some methods to compute estimated certificate
robustness, like [24], [25], [26]. The state-of-art estimated
certificate robustness on MNIST under `∞ perturbations with
ε = 0.1 is 94.18% [25], with a fairly sophisticated method.
Our discretization defense, which is much simpler and more
efficient, gives a better estimated certificate robustness of
96.43%. This demonstrate the effectiveness of this simple
certificate method. It also verifies the analysis for our idealized
generative model of images, providing positive support for the
conclusion that in the presence of well separated clusters of
pixels, the pixel defense method on a good base model can
successfully defend the adversarial attacks.
A. How hard is a dataset to defend?
The discretization defenses against adversarial attacks are
effective only for some datasets (e.g, MNIST). In the last
section we analyzed why on datasets like MNIST our method
can succeed. But it is also interesting and can help improve
the method if we can understand why our techniques fail on
other datasets and quantify how far they are to the conditions
for the success. In this section, we propose metrics for these
purposes and provide empirical results using these metrics.
Before formally defining these metrics, let us first describe
the concrete context for using these metrics to show the level
of hardness for defense. These include the intuition about the
base model, and our goal for using the metrics.
First, let F denote our base model that is naturally trained.
The fact that they fail miserably under adversarial attacks
with small adversarial budgets suggests that such models have
“peculiar behaviors”. Concretely, for any input feature vector
x, we define its robust radius with respect to F and `p norm,
δF,p(x), as
δF,p(x) = sup
δ
{∀x′, ‖x′−x ‖p ≤ δ, F (x′) = F (x)}.
In other words, δF,p(x) is the largest radius (in `p-norm),
under which F still gives consistent predictions around x.
The fact that the base model is vulnerable to small adversarial
perturbations can then be formalized as the following statement:
Vulnerability of natural models: For most points x in the
domain, δF,p(x) is small (“infinitesimal”).
Now let T denote the discretization preprocessing algorithm,
which takes as input x, and outputs another feature vector z =
T (x) (of the same dimensionality), and the final classification
is F (z) = F (T (x)). Our goal is the following:
Goal: Arguing that it will be very hard to come up with a
T that works for the naturally trained F , except for trivial
situations.
The intuition is that the base model F is peculiar while
the discretization is “regular” (i.e., the discretized image is a
product of the same discretization scheme on each of its pixel).
The restriction on the discretization, when facing the peculiarity
of the base model, prevents simultaneously getting a good
accuracy and getting consistent output in the neighborhood of
the input data.
To get the intuition, consider the following intentionally
simplified setting: each image has only one pixel taking values
in [0, 1]. Divide [0, 1] into m many intervals [(i− 1)/m, i/m]
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and the images in the i-th interval belong to
class 0 if i is even, and belong to class 1 if i is odd. Now
discretize with k codewords. When m is much larger than k,
no matter where we place the codewords, the accuracy will
not be good: if Ic denotes the set of images discretized to the
codeword c, then we know that many intervals with different
classes will fall into the same Ic’s, resulting in bad accuracy
for any classifiers on top of the discretized images. On the
other hand, if k is comparable to m, the distance between the
codewords will be small and the attacker can easily change
the discretized outcome by perturbing the image from one Ic
to another Ic′ . Therefore, the fracture decision boundary of the
data and the regularity of the discretization combined together
can prevent obtaining at the same time good accuracy and
unchanged predictions w.r.t. adversarial perturbations.
Now let us provide a more detail argument below.
1) An argument based on equivalence classes: We think of
T as creating equivalence classes, where x ∼T x′ if T (x) =
T (x′), that is, they are discretized to the same output. Now,
given an `p-norm adversary with adversarial budget ε, for each
input x, we can consider the set of equivalence classes obtained
in the ball Np(x, ε). In mathematical terms this is exactly:
Np(x, ε) = Np(x, ε)/ ∼T
where ∼T denotes the equivalence relation induced by T .
Now, we want to argue the following:
1) For a naturally trained model F , Np(x, ε) is tiled with
infinitesimal balls of different classification labels given
by the base model.
2) In order to keep accuracy, we tend to create small
equivalence classes with ∼T . In other words, |Np(x, ε)|
is large (i.e. there are lot of equivalence classes in
a neighborhood around x). In fact, not only we can
assume that it is large, but we can assume that Np(x, ε)
subtracting the equivalence class of x has a large volume
(under uniform measure say).
3) If the above two hold, then it is now very likely that
there is a small ball, with a different label, that lies in a
different equivalence class than x. In other words, if we
denote x as the equivalence class of x in Np(x, ε)/ ∼T ,
then that there is x′ such that x 6= x′, and F (x) 6= F (x′),
and we can easily find an adversarial example.
2) An instantiation for `∞ norm: We note that for `∞ norm,
it is very easy to construct N∞(x, ε). Specifically, suppose
that the input feature vectors are d-dimensional. Then for
each “pixel” x[i], we can consider the discretization of x[i]
under T , i.e., T (x[i]) (note that we are abusing the notation
and now consider the effect of T on a single pixel). So for
every i, we can consider the equivalence classes created at
dimension i for the interval: Ci = {T (z) | ‖z − x[i]‖ ≤ ε}.
Then all the equivalence classes we can create for an image
x are simply:
∏d
i=1 Ci. Therefore, the |N∞(x, ε)| becomes∏d
i=1 |Ci|. We can thus either use this number as a measure
of how fragmented the ball is under T , reflecting how difficult
it is to do the defense.
We would like to measure the quantity
∏d
i=1 |Ci| for the
datasets we use. In Figures 5a and 5b, we plot the CDF
(cumulative distribution function) of 1d logk
∏d
i=1 |Ci| for both
MNIST and CIFAR-10, where k is the number of codes (2 for
MNIST and 300 for CIFAR-10 and d is the number of pixels
in one image (282 for MNIST and 322 for CIFAR-10).
For MNIST, the measure of the median figure is about 0.06,
which means the median
∏d
i=1 |Ci| is approximately 47. Out
of 784 pixels of an image, in the median case only 47 can be
perturbed to a different equivalence class. This shows why it
is easy to achieve robustness on MNIST. For CIFAR-10, the
measure for median figure is about 0.27, which implies that
the number of equivalence classes
∏d
i=1 |Ci| is 300276, which
is a huge number and supports the hypothesis that defending
CIFAR-10 will be hard using pixel discretization techniques.
Furthermore, this equivalence class argument also gives an
explanation to the adversarial gap phenomenon (see Figure 3):
adversarial training only helps to adjust the labels of the
equivalence classes of the perturbations of the training data
points, which could be quite different from those classes of
the perturbations of the test data points due to the peculiar
decision boundary. This then leads to high robust accuracy in
training time but low in test time.
B. How Separable is a Dataset?
One key requirement for pixel discretization is separability.
In a separable dataset, pixel clusters are far from each other
such that perturbation of a pixel in one cluster cannot make
the resultant pixel to move to another cluster. This is directly
related to the equivalence classes argument discussed above.
We visualize MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets to study if they
can have separable clusters. Figure 6 presents visualizations
of CIFAR-10 pixel neighborhoods. Each axis in the plots
corresponds to a color channel. There are about 4 million
distinct pixels in the CIFAR-10 training dataset. These being
too many pixels, we plot only samples of these pixels in
this figure. Figure 6a shows 40,000 pixels on the plot,
with each axis representing a color channel. We assume a
colorscale range of [0, 1]. The color of each pixel x is given
by |N∞(x, ε)|/maxx |N∞(x, ε)|, where N∞(x, ε) is the `∞
neighborhoods of radius ε around x. For these figures we use
ε = 8. Note that the maximum neighborhood size is over 1.5
million and there are many pixels with neighborhood sizes in
hundreds or a few thousands and hence most of pixels have
colors close to zero.
To overcome the long-tail distribution of neighbor-
hood sizes, we also do a log scale plot in Figure 6b,
this time using a sample of 400,000 pixels and using
log |N∞(x, ε)|/ log maxx |N∞(x, ε)| to color the pixels on a
colorscale of [0, 1]. As can be seen from both these plots,
there does not appear to be a clear, separable clustering
in the CIFAR-10 dataset. Note that the line x = y = z,
which corresponds to gray colors on RGB, is lighter-colored,
implying large neighborhoods in this area. In fact, we have
verified that our density estimation-based algorithm selects
codewords along this line. Clearly, these codewords are neither
very representative of pixels far from this line nor do they lead
to the separability property for the clusters around them.
We also visualize the MNIST pixels. Figure 7 presents a
histogram of MNIST pixels. As we can see, most of the pixels
are black or highly white and very few are in between. This
leads to very good separability as there are very few pixels
Fig. 5: CDFs measuring the hardness of defending images in MNIST and CIFAR-10.
(a) Linear scale (b) Log scale
Fig. 6: 3D visualization of CIFAR-10 pixels colored by their neighborhood size. (a) A sample of 40,000 pixels color-coded by
their neighborhood sizes in the dataset. (b) A sample of 400,000 pixels color-coded by their neighborhood sizes on logscale.
We normalize the colorscale of the two figures using maximum neighborhood size and log of maximum neighborhood size
respectively. The maximum neighborhood size is 1,567,080.
that can actually be perturbed to another cluster or equivalence
class.
VI. COMMENTS
In the previous section, we developed a theory for evaluating
pixel discretization defenses and presented empirical results on
CIFAR-10 showing why it is unlikely for pixel discretization
techniques to successfully defend against adversarial perturba-
tions on this dataset. While our argument until now was applied
on color-depth reduction and the data-specific discretization
in Section IV, the same argument can be applied on other
discretizations such as the thermometer encoding defense by
Buckman et al. [6].
The thermometer encoding defense encodes each pixel value
x[i, j, l] as an L-dimensional vector whose k-th component is
1 if x[i, j, l] > k/L and 0 otherwise. Thermometer encoding
essentially rounds a pixel to one of L levels like color-depth
reduction but provides a fancier encoding, which was intended
to break gradient descent. Therefore, the equivalence classes
argument that we developed in Section V-A can be directly
applied here. As our results in Figure 5 have shown, CIFAR-10
will be quite difficult to defend with this technique (the exact
statistics on the number of equivalence classes will differ in
Fig. 7: A histogram of pixel values in MNIST. Note that y-axis
is in log scale.
this technique and will also depend on L).
We also observe that most preprocessing defenses to date
have been developed in an ad hoc manner, with the only
evaluation being how well the defense works against currently-
known adversarial attacks. A better lower-bound performance
of a preprocessing defense may be obtained by quantifying
how much the preprocessing technique results in the reduction
of equivalence classes for an image for a given dataset. For
pixel discretization, this quantification is somewhat easy as
the equivalence classes at the pixel level can be lifted to
equivalence classes at the image level. For other preprocessing
techniques, the specifics of those techniques will dictate how
this quantification is done.
In general, few preprocessing techniques may provide
robustness without significantly affecting accuracy to a naturally
trained model. A preprocessor T is useful only if it increases
the robustness radius (Section V-A) so that δF (T (·)),p(x) =
δF,p(T (x)) > δF,p(x). However, this requirement may result
in sacrificing some natural examples that have a label different
from x but are nonetheless mapped by T to x, resulting in a
sacrifice of accuracy. This is similar to the equivalence class
argument in the previous section. Therefore, the design of
the preprocessing defense has to be conservative so as to not
sacrifice accuracy too much. A stark example of this is in the
accuracy-robustness results of pixel discretization on CIFAR-
10 and a naturally-trained model in Table II. Formalizing this
intuition for broader class of preprocessing defense methods
is left for future work.
VII. RELATED WORK
a) Adversarial settings in machine learning: A number of
adversarial settings exist in machine learning. The primary ones
are training-time attacks, model inversion, model extraction,
and test-time attacks. Training time attacks poison the training
data resulting in learning a wrong machine learning model.
The attacker may skew the classification boundary to their
favor by introducing bad data labeled as good. Data pollution
attacks have been studied long before other attacks became
relevant [27]. In a model inversion attack, the attacker learns
information about data used to train the machine learning
model [28], [29], [30]. A similar but stronger setting is the
membership inference attack where the attacker identifies
whether an individual’s information was present in the training
data [31]. Model extraction attacks attempt to steal a model
simply through blackbox queries [32]. All these settings are
different from the setting that this paper focuses on, namely,
small perturbations to natural inputs to get them classified
differently than original inputs.
b) Adversarial perturbations: Adversarial perturbation
attacks usually work by starting with a natural example and
solving an optimization problem to derive an adversarial
example that has a different label. A number of techniques
with varying settings and efficacy have been developed [33],
[1], [34], [35], [12], [15]. The BPDA attack [10] is helpful
when the gradient of a part of the model is not available so
that gradient descent is not possible. The attack overcomes the
problem by using the gradient of a differentiable approximation
of the function whose gradient is not available. We use this
attack as the pixel discretization defense is not differentiable.
c) Defenses against adversarial perturbations: Most
defenses can be divided into adversarial training defenses and
preprocessing defenses. Currently, the most successful way
to defend against adversarial attacks is adversarial training,
which trains the model on adversarial examples. This training
in general imparts adversarial robustness to the model. The
state-of-the-art in this area is Madry et al. [15].
Several other defenses fall under the category of preprocess-
ing defenses. These defenses are model agnostic, not requiring
changing the model, and rather simply transform the input
in the home of increasing adversarial robustness. We have
already discussed pixel discretization works of Xu et al. [5] and
Buckman et al. [6]. Other techniques include JPEG compres-
sion [2], total variance minimization [3], image quilting [3],
image re-scaling [7], and neural-based transformations [8],
[9], [4]. Total variance minimization randomly selects a small
set of pixels from the input and then constructs an image
consistent with this set of pixels while minimizing a cost
function representing the total variance in the image. The idea is
that adversarial perturbations are small and will be lost when the
image is simplified in this way. Similar ideas are behind JPEG
compression. Image quilting on the other hand uses a database
of clean image patches and replaces patches in adversarial
images with the nearest clean patches. Since the clean patches
are not adversarial, the hope is that this approach will undo
any adversarial perturbation. Image rescaling and cropping can
change the adversarial perturbations’ spatial position, which
is important for their effectiveness. Neural-based approaches
train a neural network to “reform” the adversarial examples.
Most of these techniques above have been explicitly broken
by the BPDA attack and others are also believed broken under
BPDA attack. We also presented compelling evidence why pixel
discretization cannot work for complex dataset. We believe
that our intuition can be extended to many other classes of
preprocessing techniques and argue that they would not work
under strong adversarial settings.
VIII. CONCLUSION
With all preprocessing defenses developed to date against
test-time adversarial attacks on deep learning models called into
question by recently proposed strong white box attacks, we take
a first step towards understanding these defenses analytically.
For this study, we focused on pixel discretization techniques,
and, through a multi-faceted analysis, showed that if the base
model has poor adversarial robustness, pixel discretization
by itself is unlikely to improve robustness on any but the
simplest datasets. Our study may pave the way for a broader
understanding of the robustness of preprocessing defenses in
general and guide how to design future preprocessing defenses.
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